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Abstract—This paper investigates the incentives of mobile network operators (MNOs) for acquiring additional spectrum to offer mobile
virtual network operators (MVNOs) and thereby inviting competition for a common pool of end users (EUs). We consider interactions
between two service providers (SPs), a MNO and an MVNO, under two different scenarios: 1) EUs must choose one of them 2) EUs
have the option to defect to a provider outside the system under consideration should the SP duo offer unsatisfactory access fees or
qualities of service. We formulate a multi-stage hybrid of cooperative bargaining and non-cooperative games. In this formulation, first
the two SPs jointly determine their spectrum acquisitions, allocations and mutual money flows through the bargaining game;
subsequently the two SPs individually determine the access fees for the EUs through the non-cooperative game. We identify when the
overall equilibrium solutions exist and when the equilibrium solution is unique. We obtain computationally simple characterizations of
the equilibrium solutions when they exist, which are in closed form or involve optimizations in only one decision variable. The hybrid
framework allows us to determine whether and by how much the different entities benefit due to the cooperation in spectrum
acquisition decision.
Index Terms—Heterogeneous networks, Wireless Internet Market, Service Providers, Spectrum provisioning, Subscriber pricing,
Game Theory, Hierarchical games, Nash Equilibrium
F
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation and Overview
TWO different classes of service providers co-exist in thecurrent wireless service provider (SP) market: Mobile
Networks Operators (MNOs) and Mobile Virtual Network
Operators (MVNOs). The MNO acquires IL spectrum from
a regulator, which he offers to a MVNO in exchange of
money, and the MVNO uses IF amount of this spectrum.
Both SPs earn by selling wireless plans to end users (EUs);
the MNO earns additionally by leasing her spectrum to the
MVNO. Thus, they both cooperate, by sharing spectrum;
they also compete, for a common pool of EUs. They clearly
make different decisions, which affect their subscriptions;
their payoffs have different expressions and their decisions
also follow different constraints, eg, IL can be chosen to
be any positive value1 and IF must be chosen as a value
between 0 and IL (i.e., 0 ≤ IF ≤ IL). In a sequence of
two papers we investigate the economics of the interplay of
the competition and cooperation between an MNO and an
MVNO.
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1. Specifically, IL ≥ δ > 0 where lower bound δ is a parameter of
choice. Since parameter δ may be chosen as low a positive quantity
as one desires, for all practical purposes, IL can be chosen to be any
positive value. The assumption IL ≥ δ > 0, rather than IL ≥ 0 or
IL > 0 simplifies our analysis, and is not restrictive as argued above.
1.2 Relation with the Prequel
In the prequel, Part I [21], we consider that the SPs arrive
at their decisions individually, in the current paper we
consider that the SPs arrive at certain decisions together,
and then arrive at other decisions individually. Specifically,
in this paper, the SPs together decide the spectrum they
acquire (i.e., IL, IF ) to maximize their overall profits, and
the marginal reservation fee s that the MVNO pays to the
MNO for using the spectrum the MNO offers. Here s is
decided so as to split the proceeds between the SPs in
accordance with the subscription revenue each generates,
which in turn depends on the prior preferences of the EUs
for them. Subsequently, each SP individually decides the
access fees for the EUs. The IL, IF , s are obtained as the
solution of a cooperative bargaining game, and the access
fees are obtained as solutions of a non-cooperative game.
The bargaining and the non-cooperative games together
constitute a sequential game. In contrast, in the prequel,
each decision variable is selected through a non-cooperative
game, each of which constitutes a stage of a sequential game.
Also, the marginal reservation fee is considered a fixed
parameter, and the MNO and MVNO individually decides
the spectrum each acquires, and subsequently individually
decides the access fees for the EUs. Note that the marginal
reservation fee is indeed a market-driven parameter in a
large spectrum market with many MNOs and MVNOs; in
such a scenario the marginal reservation fee may be driven
by the overall market evolution, and is beyond the control
of individual MNOs and MVNOs. This fee may also be
beyond the control of individual MNOs and MVNOs, when
it is determined by an external regulator to influence the
interaction between different providers perhaps to protect
the interests of the EUs. These are the cases that the prequel
considers. In a smaller market and in absence of regulatory
intervention, the marginal reservation fee would be chosen
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as a decision variable through a negotiation between the
MNO and the MVNO concerned. This is the case this paper
considers.
1.3 Positioning vis-a-vis the State-of-the-Art
The economics of the interactions of resource sharing among
service providers have been investigated in many works. In
the prequel, we have distinguished our contributions from
those in the genre of non-cooperative interaction between
the SPs, since there we considered that they arrive at their
decisions individually. In this paper, since the SPs together
decide the spectrum they acquire, we review the state of
the art on cooperative interaction between providers, which
have invariably been modeled by coalitional and bargaining
games.
Coalitional games were investigated in [9], [10] and [20].
Transferable and nontransferable payoff coalitional games
were used in [9] and [10], respectively, to model cooperation
among service providers through joint deploying and pool-
ing of resources and serving each others’ customers. Both
papers concluded that cooperation substantially enhances
individual providers’ payoffs. In [20], MNOs weighed be-
tween building individual networks or entering into net-
work and spectrum sharing agreements. Coalitional games
with transferable and nontransferable utility were built to
show that a cost division policy guaranteed coalition stabil-
ity.
Bargaining games were studied in [4], [5], [7], [8], [15], [17],
and [19]. The cooperation between selfish nodes was formu-
lated as two-person bargaining games in [4], [7], both nodes
were seen to perform better than if they work indepen-
dently. In [5], nodes in a wireless network seek to agree on
a fair and efficient allocation of spectrum. Nash Bargaining
Solution (NBS) achieves the best tradeoff between fairness
and efficiency. A dynamic incomplete information bargain-
ing was built in [15], where the primary user does not
have complete information of the second user energy cost.
NBS can lead to a win-win situation, i.e., data rate of both
users are improved. [17] investigated the joint uplink sub-
channel and power allocation problem in cognitive small
cells with imperfect channel state information. [19] modeled
a situation of dynamic spectrum access by a set of cognitive
radio enabled nodes as a bargaining game where the nodes
bargain among themselves in a distributed manner to agree
upon a sharing rule of the channels. The selfish strategies
of the players affect system wide performance. Other opti-
mization models were introduced in [11], [13], [14], [16], and
fuzzy logic based frameworks was considered in [18].
However, these works do not consider the dynamics of the
interplay of competition and cooperation between MNOs
and MVNOs, whose roles are fundamentally different from
each other. The principal difference is that while both MNO
and MVNO earn by selling wireless plans to the EUs, the
MNO earns additionally by leasing spectrum to the MVNO.
Thus, they make different decisions, which affect their
subscriptions, and their payoffs have different expressions.
To our knowledge, [8] is the only work in the domain of
cooperative interaction between SPs, that also considers the
dynamics of providers whose roles are similar to those of the
MNO and MVNO. This paper considers that the spectrum
the MNO acquires is exogenously determined, whereas we
consider this as a joint decision of the 2 SPs. This leads
to an additional stage in our multi-stage formulation. The
subscription models for the EUs are also different, though
in both cases the EUs choose between the SPs based on the
access fees and the spectrum availability (quality of service
in [8]). Though our model is more general in that it consists
of an additional decision variable and additional stage, we
are able to obtain the closed form expressions for SPNE 1)
access fees, 2) the amount of spectrum the MVNO leases
from the MNO, and 3) the reservation fee the MVNO pays to
the MNO. In contrast, [8] only proves that the SPNE access
fees exist, and provides the feasibility region of 2) and 3).
We also obtain closed form expressions for SPNE spectrum
acquisition of the MNO from the central regulator, which
[8] considers as a given parameter. We also generalize our
model and results to allow for the possibility that the EUs
do not choose either the MNO or the MVNO, but chooses
some other SP outside the system we consider; [8] does not
do this generalization.
The only other papers that consider the dynamics of MNO
and MVNO, namely [3], [6] and [12], have considered only
non-cooperative decisions by the SPs. We have therefore
distinguished these from our contributions in the prequel,
which is closer to them.
1.4 Contribution
We now describe the contributions of this paper. First, we
consider a base case in which one MNO and one MVNO
compete for EUs in a common pool, and the EUs choose one
of the SPs through a hoteling model for subscription (Sec-
tion 2). We formulate the sequential hybrid of bargaining
and non-cooperative games that model the dynamics of the
SP interactions (Section 2.1), and identify the salient proper-
ties of its equilibrium solutions when they exist (Section 2.2).
We obtain conditions for existence and uniqueness of the
equilibrium solutions in terms of system parameters, and
characterize them when they exist (Section 2.3). We prove
that the bargaining framework yields a collusive outcome in
which the MNO acquires the minimum amount of spectrum
that he is mandated to and the MVNO leases either all
or nothing of this spectrum from the MNO (though the
MVNO is allowed to lease any amount of this spectrum).
The equilibrium solutions are easy to compute and reveal
several underlying insights: eg, only the SP that is apriori
more popular retains the spectrum leased from the regulator
in its entirety. This spectrum sharing arrangement is ob-
tained strategically to motivate the EUs to choose the SP that
offers higher price so that the overall subscription revenue
is maximized (since the proceeds are shared between the
SPs anyway). Comparing the payoffs of the SPs and the
access fees for the EUs in this paper with those obtained
in Part I [21], we show that joint decision on spectrum
acquisition conclusively benefits the SPs by considerably
enhancing their payoffs. The joint decision provides only
nuanced benefits for the EUs, by securing cheaper access
fees for them, while simultaneously guiding more EUs to
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more expensive service by having the more apriori popular
SP retain the acquired spectrum in its entirety, and thereby
provide better quality of service to the EUs. Accordingly, as
compared to individual decisions, for some parameter val-
ues the EU-resource-cost metric that we define in Part I [21]
is higher under the joint decision, and lower for the rest
(Section 2.4).
Next, we allow the EUs to choose a SP outside the system
we consider, if neither of the two SPs in the system (that
is, the MVNO and the MNO) offer a desirable combination
of access fee and quality of service. We also allow each SP
in the system to have exclusive additional customer bases
to draw from depending on his spectrum acquisition and
the price he offers (Section 3). In this scenario we show
that there are two equilibrium solutions, both of which
yield a milder version of the collusive outcome than in the
base case, in that the MNO may acquire higher than the
mandated minimum amount of spectrum (Sections 3.1, 3.2).
This happens because the EUs have an outside option to
desert to, and the SPs have exclusive customer bases to gain
from, depending on the price and the qualities of service
they offer. The two equilibrium solutions differ in which of
the SPs retain the spectrum leased from the regulator. The
SP that retains the entire spectrum gets a higher payoff in
each case. Under both equilibrium-type solutions, each SP
increases his payoff compared to what he gets when the SPs
decide their spectrum acquisitions individually. Also, the
EU-resource-cost metric is invariably higher than when the
SPs decide their spectrum acquisitions individually.
2 BASE CASE
We formulate the dynamics of interaction between the SPs
as a sequential hybrid of bargaining and non-cooperative
games in Section 2.1, we identify some salient properties
of its equilibrium-type solutions in Section 2.2 and charac-
terize the equilibrium-type solutions in Section 2.3. Using
these solutions, we assess how the SPs and the EUs fare
due to the cooperation between the SPs in jointly deciding
their spectrum acquisitions, compared to when they decide
everything individually, through analysis in Sections 2.3 and
through numerical computations in Section 2.4.
2.1 Model
We start with by recapitulating notations that are similar
to Part I [21] and the current paper. We denote MNO as
SPL and MVNO as SPF . SPL offers IL amount of spectrum
(which it acquires from a central regulator) to SPF in ex-
change of money, and SPF uses IF amount of this spectrum.
Clearly, 0 ≤ IF ≤ IL. We denote the marginal leasing fee
(per spectrum unit) that SPL pays the central regulator as γ,
marginal reservation fee SPF pays to SPL by s˜, an additional
remuneration that SPL transfers to SPF by θ, the fraction of
EUs that SPF and SPL attract as nF and nL, respectively,
and the access fee that SPF and SPL charge the EUs as pF
and pL, respectively. Let c be the transaction cost incurred
by a SP for each subscription. The SPL incurs a spectrum
acquisition cost of γI2L, and SPF pays to SPL a leasing fee
of sI2F . Thus, SPL, SPF receive payoffs piF , piL respectively,
where:
piF = nF (pF − c)− s˜I2F + θ (1)
piL = nL(pL − c) + s˜I2F − γI2L − θ. (2)
The above equations are similar to (1), (2) of Part I [21], with
the exception of the introduction of θ whose significance
will be explained later.
We use a hotelling model to describe how EUs choose be-
tween the SPs. EUs are distributed uniformly along the unit
interval [0, 1], and SPL and SPF are respectively located at
0, 1 (Figure 1 of Part I [21]). Let tL (tF ) be the unit transport
cost of EUs for SPL (SPF ), the EU located at x ∈ [0, 1] incurs
a cost of tLx (respectively, tF (1 − x)) when joining SPL
(respectively, SPF ). The transport costs capture the impact
of the qualities of services the SPs offer on the subscription
of the EUs, which in turn depend on the spectrum they
acquire: tL = IF /IL, tF = 1 − tL. vL, vF represent prior
preferences of the EUs for SPL, SPF respectively, which is
the same for all EUs, and do not depend on the strategies
of the SPs , i.e., IL, IF , pL, pF . The EU at x receives utilities
uL(x), uF (x) respectively from SPL and SPF , and joins the
SP that gives it the higher utility, where:
uL(x) = v
L − (pL + tLx)
uF (x) = v
F − (pF + tF (1− x)) .
(3)
As in Part I [21], we denote ∆ = vL − vF .
We now mention the major differences with Part I [21]. Here,
we consider a hybrid of bargaining and non-cooperative
games to model the dynamics of the interaction between
SPL and SPF . The two SPs jointly decide on the spectrum
acquisitions (IL, IF ), so as to maximize the overall profit,
but individually decide on the access fees for EUs, pL, pF .
The SPs also split the profit, by selecting the marginal
reservation fee s˜, and the additional remuneration θ. Thus,
s˜, θ are new decision variables2. The SPs decide IL, IF , s˜, θ
through a bargaining process. If the SPs, SPL SPF , are
not able to agree on these, they receive their respective
disagreement payoff s, dL, dF , which we assume to be equal to
their payoffs in the sequential non-cooperative game whose
outcome was characterized in Part I [21] (Theorems 1, 2).
The disagreement payoff is for example higher for a SP who
is apriori more popular, i.e., has a larger vL or vF , (eg, Figure
4 of Part I [21]. The disagreement payoffs also depend on the
marginal fee per spectrum unit s the SPF pays the SPL in
the event of a disagreement. This marginal fee is a parameter
determined by the overall spectrum market, as assumed for
s in Part I [21]. We also define a bargaining power of the SPs.
Let 0 ≤ w ≤ 1 be the relative bargaining power of the SPF
over SPL: the higher the w, more is SPF ’s bargaining power.
2. A question that arises is if the SPs jointly decide the spectrum
acquisitions, why would they not jointly select the access fees too. The
answer is two-fold. First, SPL offers the spectrum he acquires to SPF ,
a part of which SPF uses - thus, they share the spectrum anyhow, that
is, the spectrum usage is inherently cooperative. On the other hand,
they are competing for the same pool of EUs, it is therefore natural that
the access fees will be determined competitively, thus such decisions
must be individual. Second, in practice, the spectrums are acquired for
larger time intervals, while access fees are updated more frequently.
Joint decisions between two SPs involves substantial coordination and
negotiation, which is infeasible on shorter time scales.
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In the event of agreement, the SPs decide their shares of
the overall profit, and thereby s˜, θ, commensurate with their
disagreement payoffs and bargaining powers; higher values
of the latter two fetch higher shares of the profit. Since s˜ will
have no significance in deciding the shares if IF is decided
as 0
(
refer to (1) and (2)
)
, we have considered the additional
remuneration transfer decision variable θ (which was not in
Part I [21]). Note that θ can be positive or negative, and the
sign reflects the direction of the money flow.
When the SPs jointly decide the spectrum to acquire, so as to
maximize the overall profits, a collusive outcome may occur
in which both SPs jointly decrease the amount of spectrum
acquisitions while maintaining a specific relative difference
that yields the best outcome. The reason is that EUs decide
based on the ratio of the investment by SPs and not the
absolute values. Thus, regulatory intervention may be de-
sirable. Therefore, we consider that a regulator enforces a
minimum spectrum acquisition amount of L0 on SPL, i.e.,
0 < L0 ≤ IL. Recall that we have a minimum required
amount for IL, δ, in Part I [21], L0 may not be the same as
the δ. This is because collusion does not naturally arise in the
non-cooperative selection in Part I [21]. Thus, a minimum
amount δ was mandated merely for convenience of analysis,
and δ was assumed small everywhere. Here, the minimum
amount L0 is imposed as a regulatory intervention to ensure
some minimum quality of service for the EUs in presence of
collusion between the SPs.
We formulate a bargaining framework and use the Nash
Bargaining Solution (NBS) to characterize IF , IL, s˜, θ:
Definition 1. Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS): is the unique
solution (in our case the tuple of the payoffs of SPL and SPF )
that satisfies the four “reasonable” axioms (Invariant to affine
transformations, Pareto optimality, Independence of irrelevant
alternatives, and Symmetry) characterized in [1].
From standard game theoretic results in [1], the optimal
solution of the following maximization, (pi∗L, pi
∗
F ), constitute
the Nash Bargaining Solution:
max
piL,piF
(piF − dF )w(piL − dL)1−w
s.t (piL, piF ) ∈ U, (piL, piF ) ≥ (dL, dF )
(4)
where
U =
{
(piF , piL)|
piF = nF (pF − c)− s˜I2F + θ
piL = nL(pL − c) + s˜I2F − θ − γI2L
}
∩{L0 ≤ IL, 0 ≤ IF ≤ IL} .
Remark 1. Thus, the payoffs of the individual SPs after bargain-
ing is no less than their disagreement payoffs.
Remark 2. The above optimization is guaranteed to have a
feasible solution if L0 is lower than the spectrum acquisition of
SPL that corresponds to his disagreement payoff; it need not have
a feasible solution otherwise.
The SPs decide IL, IF , s˜, θ as per the following sequential
hybrid of bargaining and non-cooperative games:
• Stage 1: SPL and SPF jointly decide (IL, IF , s˜, θ)
through the bargaining game (4).
• Stage 2: SPL and SPF determine the pL and pF ,
respectively, and individually, to maximize their
payoffs piL, piF , based on IL, IF , s˜, θ determined in
the previous stage. The process constitutes a non-
cooperative game.
• Stage 3: EUs decide to subscribe to one of the SPs
based on IL, IF , pL, pF determined in the previous
stages and prior preferences vL, vF . A EU at location
x chooses the SP that provides it a higher utility as
per the expressions in (3).
From the above, nF , nL, pL, pF are determined in Stage 2
based on IL, IF , s˜, θ determined in Stage 1, as solution of (4).
Thus, nF , nL, pL, pF are functions of IL, IF , s˜, θ; therefore
the latter are the decision variables in optimization (4). Thus
optimization (4) is
max
IL,IF ,s˜,θ
(piF − dF )w(piL − dL)1−w
s.t 0 ≤ IF ≤ IL, L0 ≤ IL
piF = nF (pF − c)− s˜I2F + θ
piL = nL(pL − c) + s˜I2F − θ − γI2L
(piL, piF ) ≥ (dL, dF )
(5)
Definition 2. We define (I∗L, I
∗
F , s˜
∗, θ∗, p∗L, p
∗
F , n
∗
L, n
∗
F ) as an
equilibrium-type solution, when I∗L, I
∗
F , s˜
∗, θ∗ constitute the op-
timum solution of (5), p∗L, p
∗
F the Nash equilibrium of the non-
cooperative game in Stage 2, and n∗L, n
∗
F the corresponding EU
subscriptions in Stage 3. Let (pi∗L, pi
∗
F ) be the corresponding
payoffs of the SPs,
If an equilibrium-type solution exists, it may be determined
through backward induction, starting from the last stage
(stage 3) of the game and proceeding backward.
Remark 3. There is for example no equilibrium-type solution if
(5) does not have a feasible solution.
Note that the framework presented above is identical to
that in Sections 2.1, 2.2 of Part I [21] except that 1)
I∗L, I
∗
F , s˜
∗, θ∗ are determined as solutions of a bargaining
game as opposed to I∗L, I
∗
F being obtained as SPNE of a
non-cooperative game and 2) s being a fixed parameter in
and θ not being invoked in Part I [21]. Thus, once we get an
optimum (I∗L, I
∗
F , s˜
∗, θ∗), from (5), the access fee for EUs
(p∗L and p
∗
F ) and the split of EUs (n
∗
L and n
∗
F ) between
SPs can be determined from the results in Part I [21],
namely Theorems 1, 2, depending on the value of ∆. In
fact, Theorems 1, 2 of Part I [21] show that p∗L, p
∗
F , n
∗
L, n
∗
F
are expressions only of I∗L, I
∗
F :
Theorem 1. [Theorem 1 of Part I [21]] Let |∆| < 1. The SPNE
p∗L, p
∗
F , n
∗
L, n
∗
F are:
(1) p∗L = c+
2
3 − I
∗
F
3I∗L
+ ∆3 , p
∗
F = c+
1
3 +
I∗F
3I∗L
− ∆3 ,
(2) n∗L =
∆
3 +
2
3 − I
∗
F
3I∗L
, n∗F =
I∗F
3I∗L
+ 13 − ∆3 .
Theorem 2. [Theorem 2 of Part I [21]] The SPNE
p∗L, p
∗
F , n
∗
L, n
∗
F are
(1) ∆ ≥ 1:
p∗F = p
∗
L −∆, n∗L = 1, n∗F = 0,
and p∗L can be chosen any value in [c+ 1, c+ ∆].
(2) ∆ = 1 : The following interior strategy constitute an
additional SPNE:
p∗L − c = n∗L = 2/3, p∗F − c = n∗F = 1/3.
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(3) ∆ < −1 :
p∗L = p
∗
F + ∆− 1, n∗L = 0, n∗F = 1,
and p∗L can be chosen any value in [c+ 1, c−∆].
Using the above, we now proceed to determine
(I∗L, I
∗
F , s˜
∗, θ) in the next two sections. These, together with
s˜∗, θ∗, will provide the payoffs of the individual SPs, pi∗L, pi
∗
F .
2.2 Properties of the equilibrium-type solutions
We now obtain identify some properties of the equilibrium-
type solutions.
We define the aggregate excess profit to be the additional profit
yielded from the cooperation in the bargaining framework:
Definition 3. Aggregate Excess Profit (uexcess): The aggregate
excess profit is defined as
uexcess =piL − dL + piF − dF
=nF (pF − c) + nL(pL − c)− γI2L − dL − dF
(6)
We have argued in the last paragraph of Section 2.1 that
the equilibrium-type p∗L, p
∗
F , n
∗
L, n
∗
F are expressions only of
I∗L, I
∗
F . Thus, under the equilibrium-type solutions, uexcess
is only a function of I∗F , I
∗
L, dF , dL. We denote u
∗
excess =
uexcess|IL=I∗L&IF=I∗F .
Theorem 3. The equilibrium-type payoffs of SPs satisfy the
following property:
pi∗L = (1− w)u∗excess + dL (7)
pi∗F = wu
∗
excess + dF . (8)
Remark 4. The SPs split u∗excess based on their relative bargain-
ing power, SPF obtains a portion w, and SPL obtains the rest.
Each SP’s payoff equals his share of this aggregate excess profit
plus his disagreement payoff. Thus, his payoff increases with his
bargaining power and his disagreement payoff; the latter depends
on |∆|, s, γ.
Proof. From (2) in [2], the NBS (pi∗L, pi
∗
F ) satisfies:
pi∗F − dF
w
=
pi∗L − dL
1− w . (9)
From (9), pi∗L − dL =
1− w
w
(pi∗F − dF ). (10)
Substituting (10) into (6), we have
u∗excess =
1
w
(pi∗F − dF ).
Thus, (7) follows. Next,
pi∗L − dL =
1− w
w
(pi∗F − dF ) = (1− w)uexcess
Thus, (8) follows.
Since 0 < w < 1, from (7), (8), pi∗L ≥ dL and pi∗F ≥ dF if and
only if u∗excess ≥ 0.
Now, we can solve maximization (5) in two steps: 1) obtain
the optimum I∗L, I
∗
F by Theorem 4, 2) obtain the optimum
s˜∗, θ∗ by (12) and (13).
Theorem 4. The optimum (I∗L, I
∗
F ) of (5) are also the optimum
solutions of
max
IL,IF
uexcess
s.t. L0 ≤ IL, 0 ≤ IF ≤ IL
uexcess ≥ 0
(11)
Remark 5. Thus, the equilibrium-type (I∗L, I
∗
F ) can be obtained
by solving a maximization that seeks to maximize the overall
payoffs of the two SPs.
Proof. From (7) and (8)
(piF − dF )w(piL − dL)1−w = ww(1− w)1−wuexcess.
Since 0 < w < 1, maximizing the objective function of
Theorem 4, is equivalent to maximizing uexcess. Right after
defining uexcess, we have argued that u∗excess is a function
only of I∗F , I
∗
L, dL, dF . Thus, u
∗
excess does not depend on
s˜∗, θ∗. We have already argued that (piL, piF ) ≥ (dL, dF )
is equivalent to uexcess ≥ 0.
Since uexcess is a function only of IL, IF , dL, dF as noted
right after its definition, the choice of s˜, θ does not af-
fect uexcess. But, s˜∗, θ∗ must be determined so as to split
u∗excess − dL − dF into pi∗L, pi∗F , as per (2) and (8)
(
(1), (7)
follow from (2) and (8)
)
. From (2) and (8),
θ∗ − s˜∗(I∗F )2 = wu∗excess + dF − n∗F (p∗F − c).
When I∗F = 0, θ
∗ is unique; otherwise, there may be
multiple values of s˜∗, θ∗ which accomplish the above. When
I∗F > 0, we choose θ
∗ = 0 and s˜∗ to satisfy the above equa-
tion. Our solution utilizes additional remuneration transfer
only when SPF does not reserve any spectrum offered by
SPL and thus that route for transfer of money between the
SPs to ensure their commensurate shares is closed. Thus,
s˜∗ =

1
(I∗F )2
(n∗F (p
∗
F − c)− dF − wu∗excess) I∗F > 0
s∗ has no significance I∗F = 0
(12)
θ∗ =
{
0 I∗F > 0
dF + wu
∗
excess − n∗F (p∗F − c) I∗F = 0
(13)
Remark 6. Intuitively, as SPF ’s bargaining power (w) increases,
he should get a larger share of the overall revenue. Thus, the
marginal reservation fee he pays SPL ought to decrease and the ad-
ditional remuneration he receives from SPL ought to increase. The
analysis above confirms this intuition. From (11), the equilibrium-
type I∗L, I
∗
F , u
∗
excess do not depend on w. Since the equilibrium-
type n∗L, n
∗
F , p
∗
L, p
∗
F depend only on I
∗
L, I
∗
F , other than param-
eters such as ∆, s˜∗ (respectively, θ∗) is a linearly decreasing
(respectively, increasing) function of w, from (12) and (13).
2.3 Characterizing the equilibrium-type solutions
We now characterize the equilibrium type solutions. Unless
otherwise mentioned, the proofs have been relegated to
Appendix A.
Theorem 5. Let |∆| < 1. The following holds for each
equilibrium-type solution that may exist: I∗L = L0, and
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(1) If −1 < ∆ < 0, I∗F = L0, and s∗ is obtained by (12),
and θ∗ = 0.
(2) If 0 < ∆ < 1, I∗F = 0, s
∗ has no significance, and θ∗ is
obtained by (13).
(3) If ∆ = 0, both the above constitute equilibrium-type
solutions if there exists any equilibrium-type solution.
Assuming that the equilibrium-type solution exists, The-
orem 5 gives the following insights. SPL always acquires
minimum amount (L0) of spectrum from a regulator. This
is because the EUs must choose between the SPL and SPF ,
and both determine their spectrum acquisition together so
as to maximize the overall profits and subsequently split
their profits. The lack of competition leads to a collusive out-
come in which they together opt for the minimum overall
spectrum acquisition from the regulator. In contrast, when
SPL, SPF decide their spectrum acquisitions separately, I∗L
exceeds the minimum mandated amount (Theorem 1 of
Part I [21]). This happens because each SP seeks to maximize
his profit through a sequence of non-cooperative games.
The equilibrium-type solutions differ in how the spectrum
acquired from the regulator is split between SPL and SPF .
This happens because the SPs decide the split of the ac-
quired spectrum jointly to maximize their overall profits,
which is accomplished if more EUs choose a SP that charges
more. To ensure this, the more apriori popular SP retains the
entire leased spectrum: 1) SPF if vL < vF , 2) SPL if vL > vF .
If both are equally popular apriori, i.e., vL = vF , both the
above options constitute equilibrium-type solutions. Then,
even if the more apriori popular SP charges a high price,
more EUs would choose him because of his greater prior
popularity and because he can offer better quality of service
through the acquisition of the leased spectrum in its entirety.
Thus, the more popular SP gets the lion share of subscription
revenue, which he shares with the other. Thus, if SPF is
more popular, he pays SPL s˜∗I∗2F amount (I
∗
F = I
∗
L = L0
here); if SPL is more popular, he pays SPF θ∗ amount
(I∗F = 0, I
∗
L = L0 here). s˜
∗ > 0 in the first case, and θ∗
is 0 and positive respectively in the two cases, as Theorem 6
will show.
We now consider the degree of cooperation, i.e., I∗F /I
∗
L,
which clearly equals 0 or 1: these respectively arise if SPL
and SPF are respectively more apriori popular. Since the
more apriori popular SP retains the entire leased spectrum
(following Theorem 5 as explained in the previous para-
graph), I∗F /I
∗
L is 1 if v
L < vF , i.e., if ∆ = vL − vF < 0,
and I∗F /I
∗
L is 0 if v
L > vF , i.e., if ∆ > 0. Thus, I∗F /I
∗
L
discontinuously transitions from 1 to 0 as ∆ transitions
from negative to positive, the transition occurring exactly
at ∆ = 0 (Figure 1). If both SPs have equal priors, i.e.,
∆ = 0, the degree of cooperation can be either 0 or 1. In
contrast, when SPL, SPF decide their spectrum acquisitions
separately, I∗F can be between 0 and I
∗
L (Theorem 1 of
Part I [21]). Figure 1 elucidates this distinction. The plot
for the individual spectrum acquisitions has been obtained
from Theorem 1 of Part I [21] considering at each ∆, s˜
to be that which maximizes the sum of the disagreement
payoffs. In this case, the jump in the degree of cooperation
at a threshold value of ∆ follows from Theorem 1 (2) of
Fig. 1. The degree of cooperation vs. ∆.
Part I [21] directly. Figure 6 (left) of Part I [21] also shows a
plot for this case with a similar jump.
Now, s˜∗, θ∗ can be obtained from (12) and (13) respectively,
p∗L, p
∗
F , n
∗
L, n
∗
F can be obtained from Theorem 1 leading to
the following overall equilibrium-type solutions:
Theorem 6. Let |∆| < 1:
(1) If −1 < ∆ < 0, if an equilibrium-type solution exists, it
is: (I∗F , I
∗
L) = (L0, L0), s˜
∗ is obtained by (12), θ∗ = 0,
and
p∗L = c+
1
3
+
∆
3
, p∗F = c+
2
3
− ∆
3
n∗L =
1
3
+
∆
3
, n∗F =
2
3
− ∆
3
(2) If 0 < ∆ < 1, if an equilibrium-type solution exists, it is:
(I∗F , I
∗
L) = (0, L0), s˜
∗ is of no significance, θ∗ is obtained
by (13), and
p∗L = c+
2
3
+
∆
3
, p∗F = c+
1
3
− ∆
3
n∗L =
2
3
+
∆
3
, n∗F =
1
3
− ∆
3
(3) If ∆ = 0, if an equilibrium-type solution exists, the
equilibrium-type solutions are:
– (I∗F , I
∗
L) = (0, L0), s˜
∗ is of no significance, θ∗ is
obtained by (13),
p∗L = c+
2
3
= n∗L + c, p
∗
F = c+
1
3
= n∗F + c
– (I∗F , I
∗
L) = (L0, L0), s˜
∗ is obtained by (12), θ∗ =
0,
p∗L = c+
1
3
= n∗L + c, p
∗
F = c+
2
3
= n∗F + c.
Thus, considering only the values of s˜∗, θ∗ given by (12),
(13), the equilibrium-type solution is easy to compute and
unique when it exists, when |∆| < 1, with the only ex-
ception being at ∆ = 0, at which there are either 0 or
2 equilibria. The insights on p∗L, p
∗
F , n
∗
L, n
∗
F are otherwise
similar to those presented after Theorem 1 in Part I [21].
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Corollary 1. The sum of payoffs of each of the possible
equilibrium-solutions presented in Theorem 6 is:
pi∗ = pi∗L + pi
∗
F = (1/3− |∆|/3)2 + (2/3 + |∆|/3)2 − γL20.
(14)
Proof. First, from (1) and (2), we have
piL + piF = nL(pL − c) + nF (pF − c)− γI2L.
From Theorem 6, n∗L = p
∗
L − c, n∗F = p∗F − c, and I∗L =
L0. Then inserting n∗L, n
∗
F , p
∗
L, p
∗
F , and I
∗
L into the above
equation, we have the desired result.
Again, assuming that the equilibrium solution exists in each
case, the total payoff of the SPs decreases with the mini-
mum mandated amount of spectrum acquisition L0. This is
expected as this reduction is in effect equivalent to relax-
ation of a constraint in a maximization, which increases the
maximum value. Intuitively, the SPs increase their overall
payoffs if they are allowed to get away with acquiring really
small amounts of spectrums; since the EUs must choose
one of the SPs, the joint subscription revenues of the SPs
is not affected as long as both SPs acquire small amounts
of spectrum. The sum also decreases with increase in the
marginal reservation fee the central regulator charges. The
sum is maximized at |∆| = 1, i.e., when one of the two SPs
is apriori substantially more popular than the other, thus, he
can attract most of the EUs despite charging a high amount.
This enhances the overall subscription revenue. Note that
the sum does not depend on the disagreement payoffs, and
therefore does not depend on the marginal reservation fee
the SPF pays the SPL in the event of a disagreement, i.e.,
the s the market provides.
We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the exis-
tence of equilibrium-type solutions, in terms of parameters
∆, γ, L0 and disagreement payoffs dL, dF .
Theorem 7. Let |∆| < 1. At least one equilibrium-type solution
exists if and only if
pi∗ =(1/3− |∆|/3)2 + (2/3 + |∆|/3)2 − γL20
≥dL + dF = d.
Remark 7. The disagreement payoffs dL, dF depend on the
market-dependent marginal reservation fee s the SPF pays the
SPL in the event of disagreement. Thus, this s only determines
if an equilibrium-type solution exists, but not its values. Clearly,
such solutions do not exist for large γ, L0, which is consistent
with the insights developed in Remarks 2, 3. In contrast, for
|∆| < 1, the SPNE always exists, and is unique, when the SPs
decide everything individually (Theorem 1 of Part 1).
We now consider the EU-resource-cost metric introduced in
the last paragraph of Section 2.1 of Part I [21], quantified as
IF /pF + (IL − IF )/pL. We have from Theorem 6:
Theorem 8. The EU-resource-cost metric in the SPNE is
L0/(c+
2
3
− ∆
3
) − 1 < ∆ < 0
L0/(c+
2
3
) ∆ = 0
L0/(c+
2
3
+
∆
3
) 0 < ∆ < 1
.
Thus, the EU-resource-cost metric is clearly an increasing
function of L0. This is intuitive as in the SPNE the SPs to-
gether acquire exactly L0 amount of spectrum. The Theorem
goes beyond this intuition by identifying the exact nature
of the dependence. It increases with increase in ∆, when
−1 < ∆ < 0, reaches its maximum value at ∆ = 0, and
decreases with increase in ∆, when 0 < ∆ < 1. Thus, the
EUs are best off, when the static factors are equal. It also
decreases in increase in c, since the SPs increase the access
fee for the EUs with increase in c.
We now consider |∆| ≥ 1. As in Part I [21], this region is
not of much interest due to the insurmountable difference
between the prior preferences for the SPs. We show that
in this case equilibrium-type solutions exist only for very
small values of L0. Since these solutions provide I∗L = L0,
even the solutions are of limited practical utility. We state the
results for completeness. Let s, δ constitute the parameters
that provide the disagreement payoff (from the sequential
game of Part I [21]. Let γ < s.
Theorem 9. If ∆ ≤ −1 or ∆ ≥ 1, the equilibrium-type solutions
exist.
(1) If ∆ ≤ −1 and L0 ≤ 1√2s , the equilibrium-type solutions
are: I∗L = L0, I
∗
F ∈ [0, L0], s∗ is obtained by (12), θ∗ is
obtained by (13), and
p∗L = p
∗
F + ∆ + 1, c+ 1 ≤ p∗F ≤ c−∆− 1,
n∗L = 0, n
∗
F = 1,
If L0 > 1√2s , no equilibrium-type solution exists.
(2) If ∆ ≥ 1 and L0 ≤ δ, the equilibrium-type solutions
are: I∗L = L0, I
∗
F ∈ [0, L0], s∗ is obtained by (12), θ∗ is
obtained by (13), and
p∗F = p
∗
L −∆, c+ 1 ≤ p∗L ≤ c+ ∆.
n∗L = 1, n
∗
F = 0.
If L0 > δ, no equilibrium-type solution exists.
Remark 8. When ∆ ≤ −1, Theorem 2 of Part I [21] shows
that the disagreement payoffs are attained when SPL acquires
1√
2s
resource. If L0 > 1√2s , equilibrium-type solution does
not exist per the intuitions in Remarks 2. More specifically, in
this case, the SPs together attain payoffs lower than the total
disagreement payoffs, as they are forced to acquire greater amounts
of spectrum than what they did for acquiring their disagreement
payoffs. This does not increase the total subscription revenue as
the EUs must choose one of the SPs, but increases the total cost
incurred in spectrum acquisition from the regulator. Thus, the
aggregate excess payoff is negative. Hence there is no equilibrium-
type solution. If ∆ ≥ 1 and L0 > δ, equilibrium-type solutions
do not exist for similar reasons which follow from an application
of Theorem 2 of Part I [21].
2.4 Numerical results
We numerically investigate the payoffs, the degree of coop-
eration, the investment levels, and the split of EUs to the
SPs for |∆| < 1 and different values of other parameters.
We set γ = 0.5, c = 1, w = 0.2, and consider two cases:
1) ∆ = −0.5; 2) ∆ = 0.5. SPF is apriori more popular
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in the first, and SPL in the second. We refer to the sum
of equilibrium-type solution payoffs of the SPs as pi∗, and
disagreement payoffs of the SPs as d.
We first examine the condition for existence of equilibrium-
type solutions, given in Theorem 7, by varying L0 between
[0.1, 1], and different values of s used to obtain the dis-
agreement payoffs. As expected from Theorem 7, Figure 2
show that pi∗ decreases with L0, and does not depend on
s. As mentioned in Remark 7, d depends on s, and from
Theorem 7 d does not depend on L0. Thus, the plots of d
are parallel to the x-axis in Figure 2. We note that d initially
increases with s, and then reaches its maximum value, at
s = sbest = 23.9 and subsequently decreases. We consider
s = 0.8, 1, 1.2, sbest. Figure 2 show the region in which
d ≤ pi∗, for different values of s, it is the region of existence
of equilibrium-type solutions as per Theorem 7. For a given
s, we do not plot pi∗, once it falls below d; thus the curves
for pi∗ corresponding to a specific s stop whenever they
meet the d for that s. The region in which equlibrium-type
solutions exist is smallest at s = sbest and much larger at
s = 0.8. Referring to Corollary 1 and Theorem 7, in this
region pi∗ − d shows the gain in overall payoffs of the SPs
through joint decision on spectrum acquisitions. The gain is
naturally the smallest at s = sbest, but significant at other
values of s.
Fig. 2. Sum of equilibrium-type solution payoffs of SPs, pi∗, when
∆ = −0.5 (left) and when ∆ = 0.5 (right) vs. L0, sum of disagreement
payoffs of SPs is d.
Figures 3, 4 demonstrate the payoff gain of each SP due
to joint decision on spectrum acquisition (Remark 1). For
∆ ∈ {−0.5, 0.5}, the figures plot their disagreement payoffs,
Fig. 3. Equilibrium-type solution and disagreement payoffs of SPL (left),
SPF (right) when ∆ = −0.5 vs. L0.
Fig. 4. Equilibrium-type solution and disagreement payoffs of SPL (left),
SPF (right) when ∆ = 0.5 vs. L0.
Fig. 5. Sum of equilibrium-type solution payoffs pi∗, sum of disagreement
payoffs d (left), individual payoffs (right) vs. s.
and equilibrium-solution payoffs, in the region that equilib-
rium solutions exist, as given by Theorem 7 and illustrated
in Figure 2. The payoffs under the equilibrium solutions
now depend on s as the disagreement payoffs depend on
s
(
Equations (7) and (8)
)
. First consider ∆ = −0.5. Figure 3
shows that the payoff of SPL (SPF , respectively) increases
(decreases, respectively) with s. Both payoffs decrease with
L0. Also, the gain in payoff for each SP beyond his disagree-
ment payoff, due to joint decision on spectrum, is consider-
able for low L0, but decreases as L0 increases (the SPs are
forced to acquire higher amounts of spectrum for large L0
to deliver the minimum quality of service mandated by the
regulator). The payoff of SPF is higher than that of SPL in
this case because SPF is more apriori popular (as ∆ < 0).
When ∆ = 0.5, Figure 4 shows that pi∗L > pi
∗
F , i.e., SPL has
higher payoff in this case, which is intuitive as SPL is more
apriori popular (∆ > 0). The observations are otherwise
similar to those for Figure 3.
The above observations for existence of equilibrium-type
solutions and the collective and individual gains in payoffs
of the SPs due to joint decision on spectrum acquisition may
be reinforced by plotting pi∗, d, pi∗L, pi
∗
F as functions of s for
few fixed L0s (Figure 5). We consider only ∆ = −0.5 here,
and L0 = 0.4, 0.45, 0.5. Now, in the left figure, plots of pi∗
are parallel to the x-axis, while d increases with increase
in s in the range considered, s ∈ [0.8, 2]. We plot pi∗ only in
the region in which the equilibrium-type solutions exist, i.e.,
where pi∗ ≥ d. This plot also quantifies the gains in collective
payoffs by showing how much the flat curves exceed the
increasing one, in the region in which they are plotted. The
figure in the right show that the payoff of each SP decreases
8
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Fig. 6. The subscriptions (left), the access fees (right) vs. ∆.
with L0, and payoff of SPF (SPL, respectively) decreases
(increases, respectively) with s. The payoff of SPF is higher
than that of SPL, which is intuitive as SPF is apriori more
popular in this case.
Our numerical computations thus far reveal that the coop-
eration in form of joint decisions on spectrum acquisitions
benefits the SPs by enhancing their collective and individual
payoffs. We now investigate how this enhanced cooperation
between the SPs affects the EUs.
Now we investigate the subscriptions and access fees when
the reservation fee is sbest, with ∆ varying in (−1, 1). From
Theorem 6, subscriptions n∗L, n
∗
F only depend on ∆ (and are
independent of s and L0). Figure 6 plots the subscriptions
(left). From Theorem 6, p∗L = n
∗
L + c and p
∗
F = n
∗
F + c, so
the equilibrium-type subscriptions and access fees exhibit
similar behaviors. For ∆ < 0, i.e., when SPF is apriori
more popular, n∗F > n
∗
L for the equilibrium-type solution
under joint decision on spectrum acquisition. The difference
n∗F −n∗L increases as ∆ reduces, when ∆ < 0. The reverse is
observed when ∆ > 0. Since p∗F−p∗L = n∗F−n∗L throughout,
more EUs choose the SP that charges higher; this choice is
clearly induced by how the SPs share between them the
spectrum IL that SPL acquires. In some way, this benefits the
SPs, enhancing their overall revenue, and harms the EUs by
motivating them to pay more. The conclusion is however
nuanced as the EUs choose the more expensive option,
voluntarily, and only because that option provides better
quality of service by retaining the acquired spectrum in its
entirety, and was also apriori more popular. The choice is
therefore guided, rather than enforced, by having the more
apriori popular SP retain the acquired spectrum. When the
SPs separately decide their spectrum acquisitions, the trends
are similar, through the differences between the subscrip-
tions, and therefore the access fees, is less pronounced. The
spectrum is more evenly shared between the SPs (Figure 1),
leading to lower access fees and lower qualities of service
for more EUs.
In Figure 6 (right), we plot the minimum of access fees
of SPs in both frameworks: min(p∗L,b, p
∗
F,b) (min(p
∗
L,s, p
∗
F,s),
respectively) represent the minimum access fees when the
SPs decide spectrum acquisitions jointly (separately, respec-
tively). The minimum access fee represents the least cost
an EU might incur. The minimum is clearly equal or lower
for the joint decision case. Thus, joint decisions of the SPs
Fig. 7. The EU-resource-cost vs. s under ∆ = 0.5 (left) and ∆ = −0.5
(right).
benefits the EUs by providing them cheaper access. But, as
we have noted in the previous paragraph, more EUs are
induced to select the more expensive option by having it
provide the better quality of service and choosing the more
popular of the two SPs to do so. Thus, in one perspective,
the EUs gain due to enhanced coordination between the SPs,
while they lose in another perspective.
We now plot the EU-resource-cost metric quantified in The-
orem 8. Figure 7 shows that for both ∆ > 0 or ∆ < 0,
for some values of L0, this metric is higher under the joint
decision and lower for the rest. As Theorem 8 shows, the
EU-resource-cost metric is a linear function of L0 under the
joint decision, and therefore is higher or lower than that
for individual decisions (as in Part I [21]) depending on the
value of L0.
3 EUS WITH OUTSIDE OPTION
We now generalize our framework to allow the EUs from
the common pool the MVNO and the MNO are competing
over, to choose a SP outside the system, if neither the MVNO
nor the MNO offers a desirable combination of access fee
and quality of service. The SPs outside the system are collec-
tively referred to as “outside option”; we do not consider the
strategies of these SPs. Thus, the MVNO and the MNO may
both experience an attrition in their subscriptions. We also
allow the MVNO and the MNO to have exclusive additional
customer bases to draw from depending on their individual
spectrum acquisition and offered prices. We introduce these
modifications through demand functions we describe next.
Similar to equations (10), (11) in Part I [21], we define the
fraction3 of EUs with each SP as
n˜L = α
(
nL + ϕL(pL, IL)
)
,
n˜F = α
(
nF + ϕF (pF , IF )
)
,
(15)
where
ϕL(pL, IL) = k − pL + b(IL − IF ),
ϕF (pF , IF ) = k − pF + bIF (16)
3. Recall that as in Part I [21] nL, nF are the fraction of EUs from
the common pool who subscribe to the EUs, while n˜L, n˜F may be the
fractions or actual numbers of subscriptions, considering the attrition to
the outside option and the additions from the exclusive customer bases.
Only scale factors would change in the expressions for n˜L, n˜F and the
payoffs depending on if nL, nF are fractions or actual numbers.
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and α > 0, k and b are constants.
We also define g(IL) = b15IL+
1
15− c3 + k3 , f(IL) = 15IL + b5 >
0.
We characterize the equilibrium-type solutions in Sec-
tion 3.1, and examine its salient properties through numeri-
cal computations in Section 3.2.
3.1 The equilibrium-type solution
Our goal here is to examine if the availability of the out-
side option deters the collusive outcome by which the SPs
acquire the minimum mandated amount of spectrum from
the central regulator. We focus on the region in which at least
one interior equilibrium-type solution, i.e., 0 < nL, nF < 1
exists, and show that this is indeed the case. The proofs are
given in Appendix B.
Theorem 10. Let ∆ = 0. Either there is no interior equilibrium-
type solution, or there are two interior equilibrium-type solutions.
They are:
(1) I∗L,1 is a solution of
max
IL
2αg2(IL) + 2α(f(IL)IL + g(IL))
2 − γI2L
s.t L0 ≤ IL
I∗F,1 = I
∗
L,1, s˜
∗ is obtained by (12), and θ∗ = 0.
(2) p∗L,1 =
1
15 +
2c
3 +
k
3 +
bI∗L
15 , p
∗
F,1 =
4
15 +
2c
3 +
k
3 +
4bI∗L
15 .
(3) n˜∗L,1 =
2
15 +
2k
3 +
2bI∗L
15 − 2c3 , n˜∗F,1 = 815 + 2k3 − 2c3 + 8bI
∗
L
15 .
and
(1) I∗L,2 = I
∗
L,1, I
∗
F,2 = 0, s˜
∗ has no significance, and θ∗ is
obtained by (13).
(2) p∗L,2 = p
∗
F,1, p
∗
F,2 = p
∗
L,1.
(3) n˜∗L,2 = n˜
∗
F,1, n˜
∗
F,2 = n˜
∗
L,1.
We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the exis-
tence of equilibrium-type solutions, in terms of parameters
α, γ, I∗L,1 and disagreement payoffs dL, dF .
Theorem 11. Let ∆ = 0. Interior equilibrium-type solutions
exist if and only if
pi∗ =2αg2(I∗L,1) + 2α(f(I
∗
L,1)I
∗
L,1 + g(I
∗
L,1))
2 − γI∗2L,1
≥dL + dF = d, and I∗L <
4
b
.
Remark 9. Solutions do not exist for large γ or small α, following
the insights developed in Remarks 2, 3.
The equilibrium-type solutions are easy to compute as they
involve optimization in one decision variable and closed-
form expressions. They are not unique, unlike in Part I [21]
(Theorem 7).
Our numerical computations would reveal that I∗L exceeds
L0 in some cases. Thus, the deterrent of overall attrition
and the incentive of increasing subscription from the ex-
clusive additional bases, induce the SPs to acquire more
spectrum than the minimum mandated amount, even when
they are jointly deciding the acquisition amounts. Note that
p∗L, p
∗
F , n
∗
L, n
∗
F are linear increasing function of I
∗
L. Thus, the
SPs can increase both their subscriptions and access fees by
acquiring greater overall spectrum I∗L from the regulator.
Like in the base case, I∗F ∈ {0, I∗L}, and thus the degree of
cooperation is either 0 or 1. This is in contrast to the equiv-
alent case in Section 3 Part I [21] (eg, Figure 5) which show
that the degree of cooperation can assume values between 0
and 1. Then, we consider the competition between SPs, i.e.,
the subscription n∗L and n
∗
F . The subscriptions n
∗
L and n
∗
F
are constant if there exists no outside option (Theorem 6 (3));
but n˜∗L and n˜
∗
F change with the spectrum acquisition level
of SPL, I∗L, if there exists an outside option.
We can write the first equilibrium-type solution as
n˜∗L =
1
5
+ ϕL(p
∗
L, I
∗
L) +
bI∗L
5
,
n˜∗F =
4
5
+ ϕF (p
∗
L, I
∗
L)−
bI∗L
5
In both equations, intuitively, the first term, 15 ,
4
5 , represents
the subscription from the common pool, if there had been
no attrition to an outside option. The second and third
terms represent the impacts of the attrition as also the
additions from the exclusive customer bases. In the special
case that b = 0, i.e., when the demand functions depend
only on the access fees, the third term is 0 and the demand
functions capture the impact of attrition and additions in the
expression for the subscriptions. For b > 0, the second and
the third term together become k−p∗L+ b5I∗L in the expression
for n˜∗L, and k−p∗F + 4b5 I∗L in that for n˜∗F . Thus, higher overall
spectrum acquisition increases the subscription for both SPs
even in these terms. The intuitions remain same for the
second equilibrium-type solution, as the subscriptions are
merely swapped.
Finally, when L0 ≥ 4/b,∆ = 0, there does not exist
an “interior” equilibrium-type solution, that is, in which
0 < nL, nF < 1. Future research includes determining (1)
whether there exists corner equilibrium-type solutions, or
(2) generalization to the case that ∆ 6= 0.
3.2 Numerical results
We set b = 2, k = c = 1, w = 0.2 and s = 2 throughout.
For s = 2 the condition for existence of interior equilibrium-
type solutions is satisfied for all cases below. Also I∗L < 4/b
in all cases below.
Fig. 8. The spectrum acquisition levels vs. γ (left), L0 (right)
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With L0 = 0.3, Figure 8 (left) shows that the spectrum
acquisitions for the two equilibrium-type solutions (I∗L is
the same in both) exceeds L0 until γ crosses a threshold,
and subsequently remains at L0. Thus, SPL acquires more
spectrum when it is cheaper to do so; otherwise settles
at the minimum mandated amount. Now, with γ = 0.8,
Figure 8 (right) shows that if L0 is smaller than a threshold
(= 1.54), I∗L exceeds L0 and equals the threshold value, and
subsequently I∗L = L0. Thus, I
∗
L is initially constant and
subsequently increases linearly with L0.
Fig. 9. Sum of equilibrium-type solution payoff, pi∗, disagreement payoff,
d (left), payoffs of individual SPs (right) vs. L0
Figure 9 shows that the total payoff of the two SPs, as also
their individual payoffs exceed the corresponding disagree-
ment values, under both equilibrium-type solutions. As in
the base case (eg, Figures 2, 3, 4) the total payoff and the
individual payoffs decrease with increase in L0, for the
same reason as described in the paragraph after Corollary 1.
In the first equilibrium-type solution, SPF leases the entire
spectrum SPL acquires, while in the second, SPL retains this
entire spectrum. We observe pi∗L,1 < pi
∗
F,1 and pi
∗
L,2 > pi
∗
F,2.
Thus, under Nash bargaining solution, the SP that retains
the entire spectrum gets a higher share of the payoff.
Fig. 10. The EU-resource-benefit vs s
From Theorem 10, by simple calculation, the EU-resource-
cost metric is I∗L,1/p
∗
F,1 in either SPNE. Figure 10 shows
that this metric is higher when the SPs jointly decide their
spectrum acquisitions than when they decide separately (as
in Part I [21]). Naturally, for the joint decision case, this
metric is constant with respect to s, the reservation fee SPF
pays to SPL. Similar to the base case, this metric increases
with L0.
4 GENERALIZATION: LIMITED SPECTRUM FROM
THE CENTRAL REGULATOR
We now consider that SPL can lease at most M spectrum
units from the central regulator due to paucity at the latter’s
end, and generalize the results in Sections 2, 3. We naturally
assume that M ≥ L0 (recall that L0 is the minimum amount
of spectrum that SPL is required to obtain).
4.1 The base case
Theorems 5, 6, 7, 9 in Section 2.3, reveal that the SPNE
strategies in the base case only depend on the lower bound
L0 of IL. Thus, when IL is additionally required to be less
than or equal to M , SPNE strategies remain the same.
4.2 EUs with outside option
If an outside option exists in the system, then from The-
orem 10, the SPNE strategies do not only depend on L0.
Then, Theorem 10 holds with the constraint L0 ≤ IL in (1)
replaced by L0 ≤ IL ≤ M. We prove this in Appendix C.
The replacement is also intuitive.
The numerical results in Section 3.2 reveal that without this
upper bound I∗L is an interior point. Thus, if M is relatively
small, I∗L = M. If M is large, then the values of I
∗
L are as
given by Theorem 10, and as computed in Section 3.2.
5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This paper investigates the incentives of mobile network
operators (MNOs) for acquiring additional spectrum to offer
mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) and thereby
inviting competition for a common pool of end users (EUs).
We consider interactions between two service providers,
a MNO and an MVNO, when the EUs 1) must choose
one of them 2) have the option to defect to an outside
option should the SP duo offer unsatisfactory access fees or
qualities of service. The 2 SPs jointly decide their spectrum
acquisitions and the money flow between them, and sepa-
rately decide the access fees for the EUs. We propose a multi-
stage hybrid of cooperative bargaining and noncooperative
games for modeling the interactions between the SPs, and
identify when the overall equilibrium solutions exist, when
it is unique and characterize the equilibrium solutions when
they exist.
Analytical and numerical results show that the payoffs of
both SPs in this hybrid framework are higher than those
in noncooperative framework (in Part I [21]). In a market
without outside option, EUs in this hybrid framework can
attain higher or lower value of resource-cost tradeoff than
that in noncooperative framework, while in a market with
outside option, EUs typically attain a strictly higher value
of this tradeoff than that in noncooperative framework.
Future research includes generalization to accommodate:
1) arbitrary number of SPs 2) non-uniform distribution of
EUs between the two SPs in the hotelling model, 3) dis-
tinct transaction costs cL and cF , 4) potentially non-convex
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spectrum reservation fee functions that the SPF pay the SPL
and the SPL pay the regulator, 5) arbitrary transport cost
tL, tF functions of the spectrum acquired by the SPs, IL, IF .
Considering 3 SPs as in Section 4 of Part I [21] constitute a
starting point towards 1). Possible starting points towards
the others, as also that for moving from 3 SPs to arbitrary
number of SPs, have been provided in Section 5 of Part I [21].
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS FOR THEOREMS IN SECTION 2.3
We prove Theorem 5 and Theorem 7 in two steps.
Let |∆| < 1. Consider (I∗L, I∗F , p∗L, p∗F , n∗L, n∗F ) that consti-
tute the optimum solution of
max
IL,IF
uexcess
s.t. L0 ≤ IL, 0 ≤ IF ≤ IL.
(17)
Here p∗L, p
∗
F , n
∗
L, n
∗
F are obtained from I
∗
L, I
∗
F Theorem 1:
p∗L = c+
2
3
− IF
3IL
+
∆
3
, p∗F = c+
1
3
+
IF
3IL
− ∆
3
. (18)
n∗L = p
∗
L − c, n∗F = p∗F − c (19)
In Step 1 we show that any such (I∗L, I
∗
F ) must be of the
form given in Theorem 5. Next, note that an optimum
solution of (11), should it exist, is also an optimum solu-
tion of (17). Since equilibrium-type solutions constitute the
optimum solutions of (11), Theorem 5 follows.
In Step 2 we observe that given the I∗L, I
∗
F of the pos-
sible equilibrium-type solutions mentioned in Theorem 5,
1) s˜∗, θ∗ of these can be obtained from (12) and (13) re-
spectively, and 2) p∗L, p
∗
F , n
∗
L, n
∗
F of these can be obtained
from Theorem 1. Accordingly, Theorem 6 follows from The-
orem 5, as mentioned before Theorem 6. The total payoff
of the two SPs under each of the possible equilibrium-
type solutions in Theorem 6 is the same, and is given in
Corollary 1. If any possible equilibrium-type solution listed
in Theorem 5 is an equilibrium-type solution, then this total
payoff must not exceed the sum of the disagreement payoffs.
Next, if this total payoff is not less than the disagreement
payoffs, then uexcess ≥ 0 under the possible equilibrium-
type solutions listed in Theorem 5. Thus, these solutions
satisfy the additional constraint in (11) (beyond (17)), and
therefore constitute its optimum solution too. Thus, these
are equilibrium-type solutions . Theorem 7 follows.
Step 1.
Proof. Consider (I∗L, I
∗
F , p
∗
L, p
∗
F , n
∗
L, n
∗
F ) that constitute the
optimum solution of (17).
Substituting (18) and (19) into (1) and (2), we can get the
payoffs of SPF , SPL, for some s˜, θ as:
pi∗F = (
1−∆
3
+
I∗F
3I∗L
)2 − s˜(I∗F )2 + θ, (20)
pi∗L = (
∆ + 2
3
− I
∗
F
3I∗L
)2 + s˜(I∗F )
2 − γ(I∗L)2− θ. (21)
By Definition 3, substituting (20) and (21) into (6), we can
get u∗excess,
u∗excess =(
∆ + 2
3
− I
∗
F
3I∗L
)2 − γ(I∗L)2− dL
+(
1−∆
3
+
I∗F
3I∗L
)2 − dF .
(22)
Denote t∗ = I∗F /I
∗
L, (22) is equivalent to
u∗excess =(
∆ + 2− t∗
3
)2 − γ(I∗L)2
+(
1−∆ + t∗
3
)2 − dL − dF .
(23)
Now we prove that I∗L = L0 by contradiction. Suppose I
∗
L >
L0, then take IˆL = L0 and IˆF = I∗F
L0
I∗L
. Thus t∗ = I∗F /I
∗
L =
IˆF /IˆL. Since t∗ is constant and IˆL < I∗L , then uexcess is
higher with IˆF and IˆL than with I∗F and I
∗
L. This contradicts
the optimality of I∗F and I
∗
L. Therefore, I
∗
L = L0.
Take the second derivative of uexcess with respect to IF ,
d2uexcess
dI2F
= 4
9I2L
> 0, then uexcess is convex with respect to
IF , and the maximum of uexcess must be obtained at the
boundaries of IF .
Then, we obtain the optimal solution I∗F . Note 0 ≤ IF ≤ IL.
Substitute I∗F = 0 and I
∗
F = I
∗
L = L0 into (23), we have
uexcess(0, L0)− uexcess(L0, L0) = 4
9
∆.
Therefore
uexcess(0, L0) > uexcess(L0, L0) if ∆ > 0
uexcess(0, L0) = uexcess(L0, L0) if ∆ = 0
uexcess(0, L0) < uexcess(L0, L0) if ∆ < 0
⇒

(I∗F , I
∗
L) = (0, L0) if 0 < ∆ ≤ 1
(I∗F , I
∗
L) = (0 or L0, L0) if ∆ = 0
(I∗F , I
∗
L) = (L0, L0) if − 1 < ∆ < 0
.
Proof of Theorem 9.
Proof. Once I∗L, I
∗
F are determined, s˜
∗ is obtained by (12)
and θ∗ is obtained by (13). We obtain I∗L, I
∗
F , p
∗
L, p
∗
F in two
steps: ∆ ≤ −1 (Step 1), ∆ ≥ 1 (Step 2).
Step 1: ∆ ≤ −1 Suppose the reservation fee is s in the
sequential framework with s > γ. From Theorem 2 (3) in
Part I [21], n∗L = 0, n
∗
F = 1,
p∗L = p
∗
F + ∆− 1
p∗F ∈ [c+ 1, c−∆− 1].
(24)
These also constitute the SPNE, together with,
I ′L = I
′
F =
1√
2s
, (25)
that provides the disagreement payoffs, dL, dF . From (1), (2)
in Part I [21] and (25), dL + dF = p∗F − c− γ2s .
Again, from (1) and (2), under equilibrium-type solution,
the payoffs of the SPs are
piF =p
∗
F − c− s˜∗(I∗F )2 + θ∗, (26)
piL =s˜
∗I2F − γ(I∗L)2 − θ∗. (27)
By Definition 3, substituting (26) and (27) into (6):
u∗excess =p
∗
F − c− γ(I∗L)2 − dL − dF . (28)
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Note that u∗excess is independent of IF , then I
∗
F can be any
number between [0, I∗L]. Therefore, I
∗
L is a solution of the
following optimization problem,
max
IL,IF
uexcess = p
∗
F − c− γI2L − dL − dF
s.t L0 ≤ IL
uexcess ≥ 0
(29)
From (24), p∗F is independent of IL, so the objective function
is a decreasing function of IL. Thus, I∗L = L0. Since dL +
dF = p
∗
F−c− γ2s , then u∗excess ≥ 0 is equivalent to L0 ≤ 1√2s .
The result follows.
Step 2: ∆ ≥ 1: We first consider the corner SPNE for
(pL, pF , nL, nF ) in Theorem 2 (1) in Part I [21]: n∗L = 1, n
∗
F =
0, and
p∗F =p
∗
L + v
F − vL
p∗L ∈[c+ 1, c+ vL − vF ].
(30)
Along with I ′L = δ, I
′
F = 0, these also constitute the SPNE
that provide the disagreement payoffs. Therefore, from (1)
in Part I [21], dF = 0 and dL = p∗L − c − γδ2. From (1), (2),
under an equilibrium-type solution,
pi∗F = s˜
∗(I∗F )
2 + θ∗
pi∗L = p
∗
L − c+ s˜∗(I∗F )2 − γ(I∗L)2 − θ∗,
(31)
then substituting (31) into (6), we can get u∗excess:
u∗excess =p
∗
L − c− γ(I∗L)2 − dL − dF . (32)
Note that u∗excess is independent of IF , then I
∗
F can be any
number between [0, I∗L]. Therefore, the optimum I
∗
L is a
solution of the following optimization problem,
max
IL,IF
uexcess = p
∗
L − c− γI2L − dL − dF
s.t L0 ≤ IL uexcess ≥ 0
(33)
From (30), p∗L is independent of IL, so the objective function
is a decreasing function of IL, then I∗L = L0. Note that
dL + dF = p
∗
L − c − γδ2, then u∗excess ≥ 0 is equivalent to
L0 ≤ δ.
Next, we consider ∆ = 1 and the interior SPNE in Theo-
rem 2 (2) in Part I [21], i.e., 0 < n∗F , n
∗
L < 1. By similar
analysis in Theorem 5, we have I∗L = L0 and I
∗
F = 0.
Therefore from (18) and (19), p∗L = c + 1, p
∗
F = c, n
∗
L = 1,
and n∗F = 0, which is contradicted to 0 < n
∗
F , n
∗
L < 1. Thus
no equilibrium-type solution exists in this case.
Proof of Theorem 8.
Proof. We calculate m∗ in 5 cases: −1 < ∆ < 0, ∆ = 0,
0 < ∆ < 1, ∆ ≤ −1 and ∆ ≥ 1.
Case 1. When −1 < ∆ < 0. Note that I∗L − I∗F = 0, then
m∗ = I∗F /p
∗
F = L0/(c+ 2/3−∆/3).
Case 2. When ∆ = 0. If I∗F = 0, then then m
∗ = (I∗L −
I∗F )/p
∗
L = L0/(c + 2/3). If I
∗
F = I
∗
L, then m
∗ = I∗F /p
∗
F =
L0/(c+ 2/3).
Case 3. When 0 < ∆ < 1. Note that I∗F = 0, then m
∗ =
(I∗L − I∗F )/p∗L = L0/(c+ 2/3 + ∆/3).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREMS IN SECTION 3.1
Once I∗L, I
∗
F are determined, s˜
∗ is obtained by (12) and
θ∗ is obtained by (13). We therefore focus on obtaining
(I∗L, I
∗
F , p
∗
L, p
∗
F , n
∗
L, n
∗
F ) corresponding to the equilibrium-
type solutions. Let ∆ = 0. Consider (I∗L, I
∗
F , p
∗
L, p
∗
F , n
∗
L, n
∗
F )
that constitute the optimum solution of (17) (with only the
expressions for uexcess differing from Appendix A). Per
Theorem 7 (3), (4), [21], for an interior SPNE, I∗L < 4/b,
and :
n˜∗L =
I∗L − I∗F
I∗L
+ p∗F − 2p∗L + k + bI∗L − bI∗F
n˜∗F =
I∗F
I∗L
+ p∗L − 2p∗F + k + bI∗F ,
(34)
p∗L =
1
15
+
2c
3
+
k
3
+
tF
5
− b
5
IF +
4b
15
IL,
p∗F =
1
15
+
2c
3
+
k
3
+
tL
5
+
b
15
IL +
b
5
IF .
(35)
First, we show that any such (I∗L, I
∗
F , p
∗
F , n
∗
L, n
∗
F ) must be of
the form given in Theorem 10. Next, note that an optimum
solution of (11), should it exist, is also an optimum solu-
tion of (17). Since equilibrium-type solutions constitute the
optimum solutions of (11), Theorem 10 follows.
In fact, substituting (15) and (16) in Part I [21] into (1) and
(2),
piF =α(tL + k + pL − 2pF + bIF )(pF − c)− s˜I2F + θ
piL =α(tF + k + pF − 2pL + bIL − bIF )(pL − c)
+s˜I2F − γI2L − θ.
(36)
Lemma 1. In any solution of (17), I∗F = I
∗
L or I
∗
F = 0.
Proof. By substituting (36) into uexcess = piL−dL+piF −dF ,
and using tL = IF /IL, tF = 1− tL,
uexcess =4αf
2(IL)I
2
F − 4αf2(IL)ILIF + 2αg2(IL)
+2α(f(IL)IL + g(IL))
2 − γI2L − dF − dL.
Next d
2uexcess
dI2F
= 8αf2(IL) > 0.
Thus, uexcess is convex wrt IF , and the maximum of uexcess
is obtained at the boundary of IF :
uexcess|IF=IL = uexcess|IF=0
=2αg2(IL) + 2α(f(IL)IL + g(IL))
2 − γI2L − dF − dL.
Thus I∗F = IL or I
∗
F = 0.
Also, for any solution of (17), I∗L is given by
max
IL
2αg2(IL) + 2α(f(IL)IL + g(IL))
2 − γI2L
s.t L0 ≤ IL.
(37)
Substituting I∗F = I
∗
L and I
∗
F = 0 into (34) and (35), com-
bining with Lemma 1 and (37), it follows that any solution
(I∗L, I
∗
F , p
∗
F , n
∗
L, n
∗
F ) of (17) must be of the form given in
Theorem 10. Thus, Theorem 10 follows.
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From (4) in Part I [21], x∗0 = t
∗
F + p
∗
F − p∗L, substituting (35),
t∗F = (I
∗
L − I∗F )/I∗L into x∗0, then we have 0 < x∗0 < 1 if and
only if I∗L < 4/b. The total payoff of the two SPs under each
of the possible interior equilibrium-type solutions listed in
Theorem 10 is the same, and is given in Theorem 11. If any
possible equilibrium-type solution listed in Theorem 10 is
an equilibrium-type solution, then this total payoff must not
exceed the sum of the disagreement payoffs. Thus, the ne-
cessity in Theorem 11 follows. Next, if I∗L < 4/b, the p
∗
L, p
∗
F
in Theorem 11 constitute an interior Nash equilibrium in
Stage 2 of the sequential hybrid game. If the total payoff of
the possible equilibrium-type solutions in Theorem 11 is not
less than the disagreement payoffs, then uexcess ≥ 0 under
them. Thus, these solutions satisfy the additional constraint
in (11) (beyond (17)), and therefore constitute its optimum
solution too. Thus, the sufficiency in Theorem 11 follows.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF RESULTS IN SECTION 4.2.
In Section 4.2, we had claimed the following Theorem:
Theorem 12. Let ∆ = 0. Either there is no interior equilibrium-
type solution, or there are two interior equilibrium-type solutions.
They are:
(1) I∗L,1 is a solution of
max
IL
2αg2(IL) + 2α(f(IL)IL + g(IL))
2 − γI2L
s.t L0 ≤ IL ≤M
I∗F,1 = I
∗
L,1, s˜
∗ is obtained by (12), and θ∗ = 0.
(2) p∗L,1 =
1
15 +
2c
3 +
k
3 +
bI∗L
15 , p
∗
F,1 =
4
15 +
2c
3 +
k
3 +
4bI∗L
15 .
(3) n˜∗L,1 =
2
15 +
2k
3 +
2bI∗L
15 − 2c3 , n˜∗F,1 = 815 + 2k3 − 2c3 + 8bI
∗
L
15 .
and
(1) I∗L,2 = I
∗
L,1, I
∗
F,2 = 0, s˜
∗ has no significance, and θ∗ is
obtained by (13).
(2) p∗L,2 = p
∗
F,1, p
∗
F,2 = p
∗
L,1.
(3) n˜∗L,2 = n˜
∗
F,1, n˜
∗
F,2 = n˜
∗
L,1.
The proof of this Theorem is identical to that for Theorem 10
in Appendix B, with the following modification: the opti-
mization problem (37) becomes
max
IL
2αg2(IL) + 2α(f(IL)IL + g(IL))
2 − γI2L
s.t L0 ≤ IL ≤M.
This is because (I∗L, I
∗
F , p
∗
L, p
∗
F , n
∗
L, n
∗
F ) constitute the opti-
mum solution of
max
IL,IF
uexcess
s.t. L0 ≤ IL ≤M, 0 ≤ IF ≤ IL.
Theorem 12 now follows using arguments that are otherwise
identical to that for the proof of Theorem 10.
15
